When the ultimatum replaces the negotiation

CNBC reports that President Trump has threatened France with tariffs of 100 percent on wine unless the French government removes what he calls a tech 'sales tax' — a digital services levy that falls heavily on large American technology firms. The threat was issued, by the account given, ahead of the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains. I have no recollection of the specifics of that tax or the precise treaty instruments that govern it; I address myself only to the shape of what has been described.

Let me state a principle I held throughout my career as a negotiator: a unilateral ultimatum and a treaty negotiation are not the same instrument, and confusing one for the other costs more than it gains. When I negotiated with Britain in the 1790s — under circumstances far more acrimonious than a disagreement over digital taxation — the object was not to win a single concession by force of threat, but to construct a durable framework that both parties could honor without humiliation. A framework honored under duress tends not to hold.

The question before the parties here is, at its core, a question of how sovereign nations may tax commercial activity that crosses their borders without breaching existing trade obligations. That is a legitimate question, and France may well be in the wrong on the merits — I cannot say from the information provided. But the method of resolution matters as much as the outcome. A 100-percent tariff threatened publicly, on the eve of a multilateral summit, is not a negotiating position so much as a demand for surrender. Demands for surrender, even when issued by the stronger party, have a way of hardening the weaker party's resolve and complicating the relations of every other nation watching.

The G7 — which I understand (by inference, not recollection) to be a consultative forum of leading economies — is precisely the kind of institution where such disputes ought to be canvassed, qualified, and moved toward resolution through measured language and shared commitment to rules. To arrive at that forum carrying a public ultimatum is to diminish the forum before it convenes. It signals to every party present that bilateral pressure, not multilateral deliberation, is the preferred instrument.

I would counsel this: state the grievance plainly, propose a specific remedy, and set a genuine timeline for negotiation — not for capitulation. If France's digital levy violates a specific provision of an existing trade convention, name the provision and invite adjudication. If it does not, then the dispute is one of policy preference, and policy preferences are resolved through negotiation, not coercion. The public faith of the United States is worth more than any single tariff schedule. Let it be spent accordingly.