Treasury & Public Credit
A president's crypto fortune and the republic's credit
When the chief executive's personal wealth is entangled with an unregulated currency, every monetary decision becomes suspect.
Wednesday, July 1, 2026
When the treasurer-in-chief trades the currency he regulates
The BBC reports a striking fact: the sitting president of the United States has earned more than one billion dollars from cryptocurrency ventures in a single year — a sum that eclipses his returns from real estate and every Trump-branded watch or trinket combined. I will take that number at face value and reason from it, because the number is less important than what it represents.
I spent the better part of my public life insisting on one principle above all others: that public credit rests on trust, and trust rests on the belief that those who govern the nation's finances do so for the nation, not for themselves. When I designed the funding system, the national bank, the customs apparatus — I did so knowing that the moment citizens suspected the man at the Treasury of trading on his own account, confidence would drain away like water through a cracked hull. The form of the currency has changed beyond anything I could have imagined; the principle has not.
Cryptocurrency, as I understand its disposition if not its engineering, functions as a kind of private scrip — value conjured by code and sustained by collective belief, largely outside the chartered institutions that the republic has erected to stabilize money and protect depositors. I would not condemn it on that ground alone; I have seen private credit instruments do useful work. But I would ask — as I always asked of the Bank, of the bonds, of every financial instrument — under what check does it operate, and in whose interest? When the answer is that it operates under very little check, and that the chief executive holds a billion-dollar stake in its appreciation, I grow alarmed. This is inference on my part, not recollection; I cannot know the precise regulatory posture of 2026. But the structural problem requires no insider knowledge to identify.
The conflict is this: a president who profits when crypto valuations rise has a personal incentive — however unconscious — to resist regulation that might cool those valuations. Every decision touching digital assets, every appointment to whatever body supervises payment networks, every veto or signature on legislation, is now shadowed by a question the republic should never have to ask of its executive: Is he acting for the public credit, or for his own ledger? I would have said the same of any president, of any party. The republic is not served by making its executive a speculator in the instruments he is charged to oversee.
The remedy is not exotic. Disclosure — full, continuous, independently verified disclosure — is the floor, not the ceiling. Divestiture, or at minimum a genuine blind trust administered by parties with no stake in crypto markets, is the standard a vigorous republic ought to demand. Congress holds the power of the purse and the power to establish rules of commerce; it should exercise both. If the modern equivalents of the old Bank charters required officers to disclose and recuse, the same discipline applies here, with greater force, because the scale of the entanglement is greater.
Public credit is a fragile thing. It took years of disciplined administration to convince the world that the United States would honor its obligations and that its financial officers would not enrich themselves at the public's expense. One billion dollars in private crypto income does not shatter that credit by itself. But it places a thumb on the scale of every monetary judgment, and a republic that permits that — without remedy, without recusal, without rigorous oversight — has traded something precious for something merely lucrative. That is a bargain I would never have accepted, and I do not recommend it now.